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PAUL C. YUAN*

China's Offshore Petroleum
Resources Law-A Critical and
Interpretative Analysis
I. Introduction
The long-expected Chinese offshore petroleum law styled as "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Exploitation of Offshore
Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises" [hereinafter
cited as Regulations] has at long last ventured into the world after two

whole years of difficult labor. The Regulations, broad and general as it is,
is nevertheless China's first petroleum law. Hence its significance cannot be
overemphasized.

There are several factors which prompted China to invest in the offshore
oil exploration and development. First, with the onshore resources which
are conveniently located near the industrial centers in eastern and northeastern parts of China rapidly diminishing, China has to turn to inaccessible interior regions such as Dzungarian, Tarim, Szechuan, and Tsaidam
basins where the largest portion of onshore reserves are believed to exist
and where rough terrain and the harsh climate would make it extremely
difficult to exploit. Exploiting such regions, it is claimed, would involve so
many difficulties that are virtually impossible to be overcome given the
present level of technology, let alone the enormous investments that are
needed for such a project. According to recent Chinese resources, more
than one million square kilometres of offshore areas are believed to contain
enormous oil and gas and other mineral resources.' Since China's offshore
*Visiting Research Fellow Institute for Marine & Coastal Studies University of Southern
California.
THE AUTHOR wishes to express his appreciation to the Institute for Marine and Coastal
Studies of the University of Southern California for the financial support during his stay there
as a Visiting Research Fellow.
'ZHANG LI-FENO: MARINE GEOLOGY, p. 71 (1980), Peking.
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reserves may be as extensive as or even more extensive than the onshore
reserves 2 and because of the fact that these offshore oil resources are mostly
concentrated in shallow-water areas, such as the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow
Sea, and the East China Sea where the average depth of water range from
26 meters to 70 meters, 3 the offshore exploration and production operations
would not be more expensive than onshore operations as long as the water
depth does not exceed 250 feet. Second, China's modernization program
needs substantial foreign exchange, and oil offers the greatest possibilities
for earning foreign currency through export in order to finance the import
of industrial technology. Petrochemical industries can provide synthetic
textiles and other finished products which can in turn be exported. Third,
modernization carries with it burgeoning energy needs, in industry as well
as in agriculture. Farm mechanization would not be possible without diesel
oil. Fourth, as oil is an important strategic material, it is of paramount
importance to develop this material on strategic and political considerations. As most onshore oilfields, including Daqing, China's largest oilfield,
are located in the Northeast and Northwest regions near the Sino-Soviet
border, they are vulnerable to attacks in the event of hostilities. The establishment of offshore oilfields will reduce China's energy vulnerability.
Fifth, offshore oilfields are close to the industrial centers and seaports, thus
facilitating transportation and export. Lastly, offshore drilling is an effective way of staking out China's claims to disputed areas of the China's Seas.
It is against the above background that China finally decided on developing offshore petroleum resources as one of its important measures to cope
with these challenges. China started offshore test drilling as early as 1968 in
the Bohai Gulf, and about twenty exploratory wells had been drilled in the
Gulf by 1976, not counting wells drilled in other offshore areas. China is
well aware of her limited technical capabilities and economic constraint. It
is virtually impossible for her alone to achieve the goal of producing oil
from the offshore seabed efficiently and in as a short time as possible without foreign technological investment. As is well-known, China's continental shelf is one of the largest in the world that remains to be tapped for its
petroleum resources. And if American oil interests were to participate in
this development venture, it would be the largest investment American businessmen have ever made in Asia. China is now pursuing an "open door"
policy on petroleum development, both onshore and offshore. Foreign
investment will necessarily involve technological, economic, and legal considerations. One of the primary aims of the Chinese offshore petroleum law
is to ensure adequate legal protection to foreign oil investors who apparently would not invest in such a multi-billion-dollar project without first
being assured of full protection of their interests by law.
2
A.A. Meyerhoff has suggested an offshore figure of 4 billion tons and many Japanese estimates go as high as 10 billion tons for the Bohai Gulf alone. See HARRISON, S.S.: CHINA, OIL,
AND ASIA: CONFLICT AHEAD? at 43 [hereinafter cited as HARRISON].
3
Supra note 1, at 73-79.
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The present law aims at establishing a broad framework of principles and
guidelines to be followed with more detailed regulations and rules controlling all aspects of petroleum operations on the continental shelf. Although
the law might not meet our expectations in so far as its comprehensiveness
and specificity are concerned, it is China's first offshore mineral code, and
in this sense it is worth our attention and close study.
II. Policy Objectives of the Offshore Legislation
The policy objectives of the Chinese offshore petroleum law can be summarized as follows:
1) To achieve the maximum possible oil recovery to meet the nation's
4
energy needs and increase reserves of the petroleum resources;
2) To utilize as much as possible foreign capital and technology to
expedite the exploration and development of petroleum resources; 5
3) To reduce to the minimum obstructions to and interferences with
6
the marine environment;
4) To train Chinese technical and management personnel for eventual
7
takeover of petroleum operations.
It should be pointed out that the above objectives are not set forth as a
separate section in the Regulations, but instead are enumerated under the
various articles governing the petroleum operations.
As to the substance of the objectives it can be easily seen that China plans
to achieve expedited exploration and development of the shelf resources
through maximum utilization of foreign capital and technology. Since the
mining business is a highly risky enterprise, it is extremely important that
the law be made sufficiently attractive in its terms and conditions in order to
entice foreign capital to invest in it instead of in other less risky businesses.
Exploration risks must be taken into account in contracts, and foreign interests adequately protected through legislation in order to encourage foreign
investment. In this respect, the present Regulations have expressly stipulated in article 3 protection of "foreign investments in the exploitation of
offshore petroleum resources, their share of profit, and other legitimate
rights and interests ....
" It further provides for tax exemptions or reductions for imported equipment and materials. 8 The tax exemption provision
is apparently aimed at facilitating transfer of foreign technology to the Chinese and will also be beneficial to foreign contractors. However, the provision could have negative effects on the competitiveness of Chinese made
4
Regulations of the PRC on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises [hereinafter cited as Regulations], promulgated on Feb. 10, 1982,
art. I & 16.
'Id. art. 7 and 12.
A1d. art. 24.
7
d. art. 12 and 18.
'Id. art. 10.
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equipment and materials which the present law attempts to protect as can
be seen from articles 19 through 21. Thus it is a clear indication that China
would have the technology transfer take precedence over the marketing of
her own products. China is well aware that in the initial stage this contradiction might not be very acute as most of the technology used in the offshore operations are high technology which the Chinese may not be able to
manufacture at the present time or manufacture at competitive cost.
The present law fails to emphasize competition in resource development.
The importance of competitive system in accelerating Chinese national
economy has been fully borne out by the growing rate of industrial and
agricultural output each year as a result of a policy shift from the extreme
left to the moderate. 9 That competition is a driving force in industrial
growth should have been driven home to the Chinese leadership after long
years of painful experience in industrial management. As it is, the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is the only organization
entrusted by the government with the work of exploiting offshore petroleum
resources in cooperation with foreign enterprises.' 0 Perhaps the policy
goals of offshore petroleum development could be better achieved by several oil companies working in competition under the scrutiny of the central
government. Thus the objectives of petroleum legislation could be stated
as:
1) Maximum economic recovery of petroleum resources to meet the
nation's energy needs and export requirement;
2) Maximum foreign revenue for the state;
3) Minimization of financial risk for the state;
4) Maximum utilization of foreign capital and technology;
5) Assurance of orderly and timely resource development;
6) Adoption of competitive system in petroleum development;
7) Maintenance of a balance between petroleum development and
protection of environment;
8) Training of technical and management personnel through direct
participation in exploration and exploitation activities.
In planning its exploration and development programs the host country
should have as its principal goal the long term objective of finding and
developing adequate petroleum reserves, not the short-run maximizing of
national income. It would be edifying in this connection to review the recommendation of the Marine Science Commission in respect of petroleum
development policy:
The Commission recommends that leasing and regulatory policies for offshore oil
be geared to a rate of development reflecting all aspects of national interests.
'Hwa Guofeng, Report on the Government Work, presented before the Second Conference
of the Fifth National People's Congress on June 18, 1979, pp. 5-6. Doc. of the Second Conf. of
the Fifth Nat. People's Congress of the PRC (1979), Peking.
"°Regulations, art. 5, 2.
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Strong support should be given to accomplishing the analysis necessary to provide a basis for decisions on development rates. 1t

Because of China's urgency in developing both onshore and offshore petroleum resources, the warning against short-range view in planning petroleum development should be particularly important and timely. For China
the first and foremost policy consideration now is how to expedite the
exploration and development of petroleum resources, and that both for economic and national security purposes. The Chinese government may look
at the development of her continental shelf resources as an important
source for increasing the short term supply of domestic oil to meet her burgeoning energy needs and obtaining foreign exchange through export of
petroleum. The promulgation of the Chinese offshore petroleum law is an
important step toward that goal. After all, the ultimate test of the effectiveness of any mineral law is whether or not it succeeds in bringing about the
"maximum ultimate recovery of the resource, at the time when it is needed,
and at costs which the contemporary economy can afford-in other words,
maximum economic recovery, the
maximum addition to the resource base
2
of the host nation's economy."'
III. Regulatory and Administrative Agencies
The principal legislative authority for regulation of operations on the
Chinese continental shelf is the present Regulations. It provides for cooperative exploitation of offshore oil and gas through contractual relationship
between the CNOOC and a foreign enterprise. 13 Other laws applicable
include the Joint Venture Law promulgated on July 8, 1979,14 Joint Venture Income Tax Law and Individual Income Tax Law, both promulgated
on September 10, 1980,1 5 Environmental Protection Law promulgated on
September 13, 1979, and the recent Income Tax Law of the PRC concerning Foreign Enterprises (hereinafter referred to 1 6as Tax Law), and its
detailed rules and regulations for implementation.
The Regulations delegate authority over the continental shelf to the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI) which represents the government of the
PRC in carrying out its ownership rights in respect of the national petro"Report of the Marine Science Commission, "Our Nation and the Sea," at 127 (Jan. 9,
1969).
"Northcutt Ely, Policy Considerationsin the Development of Mineral Laws, NAT. REs. J.,
V. 3, p. 282 (1970).
'"Regulations, art. 13.
'Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, July 9, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
"International Legal Materials, v. XIX, n. 6, Nov. 1980, 1451-52.
"Income Tax Law of the PRC concerning Foreign Enterprises [hereinafter cited as Tax
Law] was adopted at the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and came into
force on January 1, 1982. Detailed rules and regulations for the implementation of the Tax
Law were promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on February 21, 1982. See the People's
Daily of the same dates. People's Daily is the Chinese Communist Party organ published in
Peking and circulated worldwide. It usually reflects the official views of the Chinese
Government.
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leum resources. 17 The law also prescribes the manner in which the MPI
may develop continental shelf resources. The MPI is the competent authority in charge of the exploitation of petroleum resources lying under the seabed of the continental shelf and determines forms of cooperation with
foreign entities. Authority is delegated to the MPI to administer exploration, development, production, and disposition of the national petroleum
resources, formulate policies, approve development plans, and prescribe
rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the law. 18 It is
not clear from the context of the Regulations whether the rules and regulations established by the MPI shall be submitted to a higher authority for
approval before they can become effective. However, it does stipulate that
petroleum contracts shall come into force after approval by the Foreign
Investment Commission of the PRC. 19
The CNOOC is a state-owned enterprise directly under the leadership of
the Ministry of Petroleum Industry having all the attributes of a juridical
person. It shall be independently responsible for legal and financial liabilities in all its business transactions. The MPI in turn delegates the authority
to exercise the right of ownership of petroleum resources to the CNOOC
which is responsible for entering into contractual relationship with a foreign entity in respect of exploration, development, production, and disposition of petroleum resources. However, there is a doubtful point in article 5,
paragraph 2 which, according to the New China News Agency (NCNA)
English text, reads as follows:
CNOOC is a state corporation with the qualification of a juridical person which
has the exclusive right to explore for petroleum within the areas of cooperation
and to develop, produce and market it.
Here, the wording "exclusive right" raises some questions as to the rights of
foreign enterprises in the contract area. As is commonly understood, when
the right is said to be exclusive, it excludes other entities from exercising
rights in the same contract area, and this is certainly not the case here. The
claim of "exclusive right" in the contract area directly contradicts articles 6
and 7 which expressly provide for cooperative exploitation of offshore
petroleum resources with foreign enterprises.
A reference to the Chinese text of the Regulations revealed a possible
error in English translation because according to the legislative intent of the
law, the Chinese term could also be translated as "exclusive right of control" (or simply "full control") which would be more congruent with the
spirit of the law. Of course, this misrepresentation, if true, could be attributable to the flexibility of the Chinese language. By "exclusive right of control" it tries to convey the idea that the CNOOC is the only legal entity that
has the full control over the petroleum resources within the contract area,
"Regulations, art. 4.
'"Id.art. 4, 23 ( 2), and 30.
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including exploration, development, production, and marketing. Anyway,
the use of the wording "exclusive right" here raises some doubt as to the
exact meaning the lawmakers intended to convey.
The two-tier, MPI and CNOOC, administrative system described above
looks as simple in structure as it is centralized in power. The powers are
highly centralized in MPI and in lesser degree in CNOOC. On matters
involving foreign affairs in particular, Chinese leaders still favor centralization of powers, though the system of centralization has proved disastrous to
China's economic development over the past decades, and steps are being
taken to correct it through decentralization process from the provincial
level down. This is what we call "more autonomy to grass-roots units." In
recent years some sort of relaxation has been shown in this monolithic
structure such as the establishment of special economic zones in
Guangdong Province 20 whereby the local government is given a freer hand
on matters relating to economic cooperation and technical exchange with
foreign counterparts. Since the CNOOC is authorized to establish regional
subsidiaries, specialized companies and overseas offices, 2 1 it can be predicted that a huge bureaucratic structure will be built up over the years and
will consequently hinder efficient implementation of contracts.
IV. Forms of Cooperation
There are four principal types of petroleum systems that have been used
in the petroleum industry to govern the relations between the host country
and the international oil company: the concession (also called "permit,"
"license" or "lease"), the joint venture, the production sharing contract (or
service contract), and full state participation. In any type of these arrangements an agreement is necessary between the host country and the oil company whereby rights and obligations are created. However, it is a special
type of contract because one of the parties to the contract is the state or a
state agency, which has greater power and freedom of action than a private
status that gives it special recognition abroad
party and has international
22
for juridical purposes.
In recent years the trend is toward greater participation of the state in the
petroleum resource development and that solely because the producer
countries have perceived the need of controlling this critical resource in
order to strengthen its economic and strategic position in the world arena.
The concept of direct state participation in the development of petroleum
resources has been widely accepted and implemented in many parts of the
world, and both developing and developed countries have enacted laws and
2
°Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province adopted at the Fifteenth
of the National People's Congress Standing Committee of August 26, 1980, art. I.
Session
2
Regulations, art. 5, 3.
22Martin, P.H.: Host Country Controls in the Petroleum Industry, paper submitted to the
Regulation of International Business, April 12, 1974.
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acts that assure them of direct participation in the management of petroleum operations, including the power of determining the rate, price, and
distribution of production. The formula commonly adopted is the joint
venture, production sharing, or full state participation. Even the United
States which has traditionally favored the concession system is now beginning to explore options whereby the government would have an operating
interest. The degree of success achieved by the various systems as adopted
by different countries varies greatly, and this in large measure "reflects the
petroleum potential and the bargaining strengths of the countries
''23
involved.
The Chinese offshore petroleum law did not explicitly specify what form
of cooperation will be adopted for the petroleum industry to govern the
relations between the host country and the international oil companies.
However, article 7 of the Regulations stipulates that the foreign contractor
shall provide "exploration investment, undertake exploration operations
and bear all exploration risks," unless otherwise specified in the contract,
and that the Chinese will not begin investing until a commercial oil field is
discovered. This provision puts China in the position of a sure winner in
the oil gamble and the international oil company a possible loser because of
the extremely risky nature of offshore development. The Chinese are also
realistic enough as to back out from the initial development and production
operations. During this period the Chinese seem to play a dual role of policy-making and supervising. The foreign oil company will be responsible
for the operations until such time when the Chinese deem it opportune for
them to take over the production operations according to the provisions of
the contract. In compensation for the investment and expenses incurred by
the foreign contractor, he shall receive remuneration out of the petroleum
produced according to the provisions of the contract.
From the above analysis, it leaves little doubt that China will opt for
either the joint venture or production sharing formula as the main form of
cooperation with foreign oil companies.
1. Joint Venture

The joint venture system was first started in 1957 when Iran entered into
an agreement with the Italian agency ENI and its subsidiary AGIP. The
joint venture can be defined as an agreement under which the host country
or a national oil company and a private oil company agree to jointly
develop and produce petroleum with the oil company assuming all risks
and burdens of exploration. If petroleum was found and production begun,
a separate operating company jointly owned by the state and a private company will be formed to take over the joint venture operations. This separate
legal entity is then authorized to produce and sometimes undertake the
23

R.B. KRUEGER, WORLD PETROLEUM POLICIES REPORT, ENERGY LAW SERVICE, (Mono-

graph 13C), Feb. 1981, at 34-35 [hereinafter cited as World Report].
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marketing of petroleum produced under the agreement. Costs and profits
are to be shared according to each party's equity in the enterprise.
The Chinese Joint Venture Law, promulgated on July 8, 1979, establishes
a legal framework for the protection and regulation of business enterprises
involving foreign and Chinese capital. The successful operation of the joint
venture system in countries having similar economies to China's has proved
that the system yields more benefit to both parties than any other form of
petroleum system. 24 Under the joint venture system the host country will
obviously reap benefit from foreign managerial and technical expertise, and
this will be of particular significance to China's modernization program.
This system is also consistent with China's basic policy concerning state
control of natural resources.
2. Production Sharing Contract
The production sharing contract differs from the joint venture in that no
jointly owned company is created and title to the petroleum produced is
vested in the host country until it is disposed of either by selling to the
foreign company or marketing abroad. The foreign company actually acts
as a contractor to the host country and bears production, exploration, and
development expenses and receives in return a certain free share of the
annual production (after recovery of cost) or a guaranteed price for a fixed
share of the production depending on the agreement. The contractor will
also be given the opportunity to market the petroleum produced for a commission. The production sharing formula exempts the host government
from any financial commitments in connection with petroleum operations
while at the same time allowing the state to participate in the control of
petroleum operations. The host country will receive an agreed upon minimum share of production regardless of how much the oil company will
have to pay for its exploratory and development costs.
The difference between the production sharing contract and the service
contract simply lies in the manner in which the foreign oil company
receives compensation. The following paragraph explains the difference in
most succinct terms:
If the reward is the guaranteed purchase by [the contractor] of a certain percentage of the annual production at a special [and sometimes] favorable price (and
treating the costs as a loan to be repaid by the national oil company with or

without interest), [or simply cash payments in some instances], the arrangement is
usually known by the general term "service contract." If the reward consists of
allowing the contractor a certain free share of the annual production (after recovthe arrangement is usually known as a production sharing
ery of costs),
25
contract.
2'Franko, InternationalJoint Venture in Developing Countries.-Mystique and Reality, 6 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 315 (1974).

"It was Indonesia which first developed the concept of production sharing contract in 1966,
and since then the system has been adopted in as many as 15 other countries, including Egypt,
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There are positive aspects of the PSC which are very attractive to a host
country like China which has not enough hard currency to finance its oil
development and will have to depend in a large measure upon compensation arrangement, i.e. repayment in oil. The PSC system is also consistent
with China's avowed policy of self-reliance in its economic construction
because the host country's national oil company is given the responsibility
to manage the operations and exercise ultimate control with the contractor
acting as advisor on matters of importance. Under the PSC as practiced by
Indonesia and Brazil, the foreign oil company is obligated to satisfy the
host country's domestic oil needs from its share of production for which the
contractor receives only a minimal payment. Under the Indonesian PSC
model, the title to production equipment purchased by the Contractor pursuant to the work program passes to the host country at point of import and
the contractor is required to make rental payments to the host government
for use of the equipment. This is different from the Regulations in which
article 22 stipulates that all assets purchased and built by the foreign contractor for implementation of the petroleum contract "shall be owned
entirely by CNOOC when the foreign contractor has fully recovered its
investments for those assets." But the foreign contractor may continue to
use those assets in accordance with the provisions of the contract.
The advantages the PSC can offer are important to China as an emerging
world power with its burgeoning energy needs and ambitious drive for economic development. The PSC system not only offers possibilities to meet
China's expanding energy needs, but also assures a steady reserve of foreign
currency through compensation arrangement. As the host country is given
the control over the management of oil operations, the system is in tandem
with the basic thrust of China's development strategy and long-term offshore petroleum development.
There seems to be a loophole in article 15 which only provides that articles 3, 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the Regulations shall apply to foreign subcontractors without mentioning article 22. Thus, legally speaking, all assets
purchased and built by the subcontractor will not fall under the provisions
of article 22.
The Regulations expressly provide for the adoption of bidding system in
entering into petroleum contracts with foreign enterprises. 26 It has been
reported that the Chinese are now experimenting with bidding systems with
its domestic contractors in socialist construction. Article 3 of the "Temporary Regulations promulgated by the State Council on Development and
Protection of Socialist Competition" states that for those production and
Libya, Nigeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, South Yemen, India, Bengladesh, Burma, Malaysia,
Sri Lanka, Philippines, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Zakariya, New Directions in the Searchfor
andDevelopment o/PetroleumResources in the Developing Countries, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. at 563. The production sharing concept is regarded as an important step toward reconciling
national and international interests in natural resources development.
"Regulations, art. 6.
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construction projects to which work contracts are applicable, bidding systems can be used on a trial basis.27 According to one published report, a
Geological Bureau of Yunnan Province had successfully applied the bidding system to an exploration contract for phosphate mining and was
reported to have saved JMP V43,900 (equivalent to about U.S. $26,000) for
the state, about one fourth lower in cost than the previous similar undertaking. 28 The Chinese bidding system for offshore oil development might
deviate from the traditional bidding and would be based on the percentage
of eventual oil production with which the oil company would be satisfied as
payment, apart from drilling obligations and required exploration outlays.
Thus the Chinese would benefit from maximization of both profits and oil
recovery because the bidder agreeing to the lowest percentage of oil production would generally be accepted. In awarding exploration and development contracts, the Chinese will also consider such factors as experience
and competence of the applicants and the quality and feasibility of their
proposed work programs.
V. Operations
To entitle the contractor to engage in offshore operations pursuant to
petroleum contracts concluded with the CNOOC, he shall establish a representative office in the PRC which will be authorized to represent the con29
tractor in carrying out the terms and conditions laid down in the contract.

The contractor shall register with a competent authority which the Regulations did not specify but which most probably is the General Administration for Industry and Commerce (GAIC) within a specified period of time
from the date of entry into force of the petroleum contract. In addition, the

contractor shall, in carrying out various petroleum operations as specified
in the contract, establish operational support bases within the territory of
30
the PRC.
The law requires that the provisions of the petroleum contract be consistent with the rules and regulations of the PRC and relevant state stipulations 3' and that the petroleum contract become effective upon authorization
by the Foreign Investment Commission (FIC). 32 The contractor shall submit an overall oil and gas development plan to the Ministry of Petroleum
Industry for authorization. 33 Such a plan shall be consistent with the regulations, directives, and rules which the MPI may promulgate from time to
"People's Daily, Jan. 5, 1981, p. 2. The Temporary Regulations was published by Xinhau
News Agency on Oct. 29, 1980.
2
Id. Jan. 19, 1981, p. 2.
'.Regulations, art. 14.
30
1d. art. 17.
3
'1d. art. 3, 2.
32Id. art. 6,
2.
3Id. art. 16 and 4.
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time for compliance. 34 The plan shall meet the requirements for conservation of the natural resources of the continental shelf, safety operations, protection of fishery and environment and other marine activities. 35 The law
also requires that the operator shall carry out petroleum operations in
accordance with good international operating practice. 36 The law requires
that the contractor pay a fee for the use of the mine area. 37 There seems to
be an error in the English translation released by the New China News
Agency. The Chinese term in article 9 concerning payment can be literally
translated into English as "a fee for the use of the mine area" which is in
effect similar to a rental payment. However, the translator took the liberty
of translating it into "royalty," a typical term of mineral law that has its
own definition. The use of the term "royalty" here is certainly misleading.
Article 3 of the Regulations provides that the duly authorized government representatives shall have the right to inspect any operational vessel,
platforms, construction sites, and other installations. The law further provides that all petroleum produced and saved from the contract area shall be
or exported from oil
delivered on shore in the People's Republic of China
38
and/or gas metering point of offshore terminals.
There are no provisions in the Regulations concerning the duration of an
exploration and development contract. However, according to the contract
concluded in 1980 between China National Petroleum Company and the
Japanese National Oil Corporation, the term is fifteen years which, according to the Chinese Joint Venture Law, may be extended to as long as twenty
to thirty years or even longer, subject to authorization by the Foreign
Investment Commission. 39 Under the terms of the above contract concerning the exploration and development of the Bohai Gulf, the Japanese Oil
Company is obligated to undertake the risks and portion of the exploratory
expenditures during the exploration phase. The development costs will be
borne almost equally by both parties, China paying 51 percent of the costs
and Japan 49 percent. As to the allocation formula, the contract provides
that the Japanese shall receive 42.5 percent of the output over a fifteen-year
period. This percentage covers China's repayment of Japanese loans for its
investment in the oil development plus interest and fees for JNOC's performance. 40 Another 42.5 percent goes to China. The remaining 15 percent is earmarked for cost recovery. The length of the exploration period is
generally fixed at four to five years with the option to extend for an additional two years. The development phase may range from fifteen to twenty
years or even longer.
34

jd.

art. 24.
1d. art. 16.
"Id. art. 9.
MId. art. 25.
"'Law of the PRC on Joint Venture Using Chinese and Foreign Investment [hereinafter cited
Joint Venture Law], art. 12. 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1163 (1979).
'°JAPAN ECON. J., Aug. 21, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
Mid.

6
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The Regulations provide that CNOOC is the owner of all the data, technical or otherwise, obtained in the course of the petroleum operations. The
disposal of the above-mentioned data including transmission to outside the
PRC shall conform to the regulations governing control of data and infor4
mation as stipulated by the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. '
VI. Disposition of Petroleum
The Regulations stipulate that the petroleum resources belong to the
State. 42 Individuals or entities not authorized by the MPI shall have no
right to explore for, develop, produce, and dispose petroleum resources, nor
shall he derive any right or benefit therefrom. The Chinese government
shall, by the legislation in force, protect the resources invested by the Contractor and other foreign individuals or entities participating in the offshore
petroleum operations in the PRC, their profits, as well as other legitimate
rights and interests. The law allows foreign contractors to export the petroleum due them and to remit their recovered investment, profits, and other
43
legitimate income.
In times of crisis, such as war, danger of war, or other emergency situations which are not enumerated, the government of the PRC has the right to
requisition by purchase or turn over for use a portion of the whole of the
petroleum due to the foreign contractor regardless of whatever terms may
have been provided in the petroleum contract. Here again, the English version does not coincide with the Chinese text which should be put this way:
In case of war, danger of war, or in other emergency situations, the government
of the PRC shall have the right to requisition bypurchase (the italicized is the
author's) or take over for use a portion
44 or all of the petroleum obtained and/or
purchased by the foreign contractor.
The question of possible expropriation is particularly sensitive to foreign
investors, especially in a country where political turmoil and power struggle
have never been known to cease for the past half century. The new law
gives some but not complete guarantee of compensation in the event of
requisition. Although one Chinese top official has assured American oil
companies that "justifiable compensation" will be paid in case of nationalization, 45 foreign oil businessmen are still leery of it.
There is also the question of how to define the "danger or threat of war"
and "emergency situations." This will have to be left to the mercy of the
host government.
"Regulations, art. 23.
4

1d. art. 2.

"Id. art. 3 and 8.
"Id. art. 26.
41"Some
Aspects of China's Work in Economy, Trade and Law," Address by Ren Jianxin,
Director of the Legal Affairs Dept., China Council for the Promotion of International Trade,
in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1979).
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VII. Environmental Protection
The provisions of the Regulations relating to environmental protection in
the offshore petroleum development are couched in very general terms.
The law calls for the oil companies participating in the petroleum operations to carry out operations in accordance with good international practice

and the laws of the PRC. They shall insure safety in operations, protect
fishery and other natural resources, and prevent the air, seas, rivers, lakes
46
and lands from pollution or damage.

However, the law is strangely silent on the effects offshore operations will
bring to the navigation. To the author's knowledge, in an earlier draft of
the petroleum law the operator was required to reduce to the minimum
obstructions to and interferences with navigation. Is it a deliberate omission? If so, then it might be related to the issue of the limit of China's
jurisdiction over the continental shelf.4 7 China believes that the offshore
operations are carried out well within its own jurisdictional limit, hence
interference with navigation should not be an issue to be brought up by
other countries. Rather it is an internal problem to be solved among themselves. The second possibility might be that China would not commit itself
to such an obligation toward the world community at large. If this were the
case, then it would contradict the position taken by the Chinese delegate at
the second Subcommittee of the U.N. Seabed Committee in 1973 at which
the Chinese working paper submitted by the delegate stated:
The superjacent waters of the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea, the economic zone or the fishing zone are not subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal
State. The normal navigation and overflight on the superjacent waters of the
continental shelf and in4the
air space thereabove by ships and aircraft of all states
8
shall not be prejudiced.
This is in line with the 1958 Geneva Convention concerning the legal status
of the superjacent waters as high seas.4 9 In order to fully insure the legal
status as high seas of the waters lying above the shelf, paragraph 1 of article
5 of the 1958 Convention provides that the exercise of the rights of the
coastal state must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other states as provided for in the
Convention. There will be, no doubt, interferences with the freedom of the
high seas as long as there is activity on the continental shelf. What the 1958
Convention as well as the Draft Convention prohibits is only "unjustifiable
interference."
There is a general statute on environmental protection which is in many
ways comparable to the United States National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). This Chinese "NEPA" is called "The Environmental Protection
4'Regulations,

art. 24.
'This issue has been treated in detail in another article by the author which is available
upon
request.
4
Doc. A/AC. 138/SC II/L. 34 (1973).
4'1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2 (1) and (4).
1U.N.
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Law of the PRC" (EPL) adopted at the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress on September 13, 1979 for
trial implementation. This is the first environmental law China has ever
formulated since the founding of the People's Republic. Its promulgation
represents China's major efforts to cope with the ever increasing dangers of
environmental pollution which has become so serious in some parts of
China and to insure smooth implementation of China's modernization
program.
There was strictly speaking no environmental law in China until the promulgation of the present law. Most of the policies on environmental protection work were sporadically contained in talks by leaders of the
government at various levels. The first national conference on environmental protection was held in August 1973, during which guidelines governing
environmental work were first laid down which can be summarized in
thirty-two characters known as "Thirty-Two Character Policy" now incorporated into the environmental law as article 4. Following the first national
conference a number of separate regulations were made which include
"Tentative Standards of PRC for the Discharge of Industry's 'three wastes'
(1974)," 10 "Temporary Provisions of PRC on the Prevention of Pollution in
Offshore Waters" (1974),51etc. However, these regulations, like any other
regulations of the period, had never been implemented in real earnest. It
was not until the fall of the "gang of four" that the law and order began to
be restored. The Chinese Constitution adopted at the first meeting of the '
Fifth National People's Congress stipulates for the first time in its article 11
that "The State protects the environment and natural resources and prevents and eliminates pollution and other hazards to the public." In the
report on the government's work made at the Fifth National People's Congress Premier Hua said that "to eliminate pollution and protect the environment in a matter of primary importance that is closely related to the
welfare of the people at large and which calls for our utmost
attention ...."52
The environmental law has thirty-three articles in all and, like NEPA,
spell out in very broad and general terms China's national environmental
policy and goals, which is to promote environmental considerations in the
decisionmaking at all governmental levels from the provinces down to the
counties and districts. It includes guidelines concerning the relationship of
National Environmental Protection Office which is the Chinese counterpart
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to its local environmental
'Reprinted in SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION compiled by the
Environmental Protection Office of the Anshan Steel Corporation, 1975 (?).
"The Temporary Regulations was reprinted in SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. The author is not quite sure whether the Temporary Regulations has been
publicly publicized. The English translation is the author's own.
"MA XIANG-CONG,

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW,

FAXUE YANJIU (Legal Studies), No. 2, at 42 (1979).
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protection organizations. NEPA requires that all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" be accompanied by a detailed statement by the responsible official on the environmental impact of the proposed action.5 3 Similarly, the EPL requires that an
assessment be made of the potential environmental impact on the human
environment before any major engineering project can get underway and
that the environmental report be subject to approval by competent
authorities.
Although there are no specific clauses controlling offshore exploration
and development operations, there are, like NEPA, general provisions that
are applicable nationwide to all cases insofar as environmental protection is
concerned. It stipulates that all enterprises and institutions shall pay adequate attention to the prevention of pollution and damage to the environment when selecting their sites, designing, constructing, and planning
production. In planning such projects, a report on the potential environmental effects shall be submitted to the environmental protection department and other relevant departments for examination and approval before
designing can be started. 54 From this it follows that similar requirements
will also be imposed on offshore operations such as submission of a report
on assessments of the potential environmental effects in the offshore area
before offshore engineering projects can get underway.
Article 12 of the EPL specifically relates to the exploitation of mineral
!'esources. It reads as follows:
In exploiting mineral resources, comprehensive surveying, evaluation, and utilization should be carried out. Excavating and mining at random is strictly forbidden, and tailings and slags should be appropriately disposed of, to prevent
damage to resources and fouling the natural environment.

Although the clause is directed toward exploitation of land resources, it will
be applicable to offshore exploitation as well from the spirit of the law.
Dumping garbage and waste residues into the waters is prohibited. The
law specifically prohibits ships from discharging substances containing oil
or poison, and other harmful wastes into the water protected by the law.
The law provides punishment for those who have violated the environmental law and regulations ranging from criticisms, warnings, fines, paying
damages, to an order to stop production until such pollution is brought
under control and eliminated. The EPL provides for civil and criminal
penalties in case of serious pollution and damage to the environment resulting in causalties or substantial damage to farming, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishing. 5

'"42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
'The Environmental Protection Law of PRC [hereinafter cited Environmental Law], art. 6.

"Id. art. 32(2).
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1. Offshore Environmental Regulations
To the author's knowledge, there was also a statute styled "Temporary
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention of Pollution of Offshore Waters" approved by the State Council on January 30,
1974 [hereinafter cited as Temporary Regulations] for trial implementation. 56 The Temporary Regulations was promulgated with a view to
preventing pollution of offshore waters by oil or oily mixtures and other
harmful substances in order to insure cleanness and safety in offshore areas
and harbours. Although most of the regulations related to discharge of oil
or oil mixtures and other harmful substances by ships, there were provisions governing factors and mines situated along the sea cost including offshore oil wells. Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Temporary Regulations
provides that:
Factories and mines situated along the sea coast (including cabin-washing stations, workshops, or factories for dismantling or repairing used ships, and offshore oil wells) shall discharge oil or oily mixtures and wastes in conformity with
the national tentative standards concerning discharge of industrial wastes abbreviated as "three wastes" (waste water, waste gas, and waste slags).
Article 2, paragraph 7 further provides:
Oil terminals, oil refineries, oil docks, and oil loading and unloading facilities
near sea areas shall be maintained in good order, and strict measures be taken to
prevent oil from escaping, spilling, dripping, and leaking. Investigations shall be
made and responsibility affixed in respect of any violations thereof.
There are two exceptions to the provisions of article 2:
(1) In case of force majeur, where the discharge of oil or oily mixtures by the ship
is for the purpose of insuring safety of, or avoiding damage to, the ship or goods,
or for the rescue of life at sea.
(2) Due to damage to the ship, or after discovery of oil leakage and in spite of
various measures taken, there is still leakage of oil or oil mixtures from the ship.
A glimpse of the Chinese environmental law shows that the law is still in
the developing stage and that most provisions are too general and schematic
and is in need for further elaboration. With offshore oil development projects now underway, China will have to enact more laws and regulations to
govern the marine environment in the offshore area. The conflict between
the protection of environment and petroleum development has become one
of the most snarled problems facing the government and the private oil
industry in many countries. In a socialist country as China, the problem
has not yet assumed such important proportions as there is no private
industry to oppose the government's environmental measures. All the government needs to do is to strike a balance as reasonable as possible between
the two conflicting interests. As China looks at the oil development as one
of the major steps toward expediting its modernization program, it is
"°Supra,note 51.
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unlikely that environmental protection will be given high priority consideration that it deserves in China's overall industrial planning.
VIII. Disputes and Violations of the Regulations
The Regulations provide for the resolution of disputes arising out of
cooperative exploitation of offshore petroleum resources through friendly
consultations, failing which the dispute may be brought before an arbitration body of the PRC or another arbitration body agreed upon by both
7
parties for mediation or arbitration.
,Article 14 of the Joint Venture Law provides for conciliation or arbitration of disputes in the case of failure to settle disputes through consultation.
It permits either the use of a Chinese arbitral body in Beijing (Peking),
under the Chinese Arbitration rules, or another mutually agreed-upon arbitral body outside the PRC, as in Stockholm under its Chamber of Commerce rules. The Trade Agreement between the United States and the
People's Republic of China provides an important vehicle for settling disputes between American and Chinese investors. It calls for "friendly consultation, conciliation or other mutually acceptable means," 5 8 failing which
arbitration may be resorted to.
The Regulations provide that the Ministry of Petroleum Industry is
authorized to impose administrative injunctions on an operator or subcontractor who violates the regulations in conducting petroleum operations by
giving him a warning and demanding compliance within a prescribed time,
failing which the MPI shall have the right to take other measures, even to
the extent of suspending its right to conduct petroleum operations. The
parties violating the regulations shall be held responsible for all economic
losses as the result of such violations. In case of serious violations, the party
involved shall be fined or even be sued by the MPI.
IX. Other Legal Issues
1.Taxes
China has recently promulgated "Income Tax Law of the PRC concerning Foreign Enterprises" (hereinafter cited as Tax Law) which was adopted
in the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and which
came into force on January 1, 1982. Detailed rules and regulations for the
implementation of the Tax Law were promulgated by the Ministry of
Finance on February 21, 1982.
The Tax Law is formulated under the guiding principle of attracting foreign investment and expediting the development of China's economic coop"Regulations, art. 27.
"US-PRC Trade Agreement, art. 8(1).
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eration and technical exchange with foreign countries. 59 Since the crux of
the tax issue is the tax rate, the Tax Law is established on the principle of
"more profit more income tax, less profit less income tax, and equal treatment" and is applicable to all industries, including petroleum, regardless of
whatever nationality a foreign enterprise may be. 60 It is believed that the
tax rate is established on a reasonable basis with a slight slant towards leav6
ing some margin for profit so as to attract foreign investment. '
The income tax is assessed at progressive rates for the parts in excess of a
specific amount of taxable income, with the tax rate ranging from 20 percent for annual income below 250,000 yuan 62 to 40 percent for annual
income above one million yuan, plus 10 percent local tax. As to the creditability of Chinese taxes in the United States, it is highly probable that they
would be creditable according to an interview with Mr. Zhang Wenbin,
vice-minister of the Petroleum Ministry, who was alleged to have said "The
tax issue is under discussion. We now think there will be no problem with
63
the tax credit."
Since the promulgation of the recent Tax Law does not exclude the applicability of the Joint Venture Income Tax Law promulgated on September
10, 1980, the latter still controls where applicable.
Thus, along with the "Regulations of the PRC on the Exploitation of
Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises"
promulgated on February 10, 1982 and a model contract to be available
soon, China has almost completed its preparations for going ahead full
steam with bidding on its offshore oil exploration and development.
2. Exchange Control
The Regulations simply provide that the foreign contractor may remit
abroad the investment it recovers, its profits and other legitimate income 64
without mentioning whether or not such remittance is subject to foreign
exchange control. However, article 11 does provide that the foreign contractor shall open a bank account in accordance with the provisional regulations for exchange control.
According to the Joint Venture Law, the net profit of a foreign participant, as well as the capital funds received upon the venture's termination
may be repatriated in currency specified in the contracts, subject, however,
to the foreign exchange regulations of the PRC. It was reported that the
new foreign exchange controls were issued by the State Council of the PRC
"9A written explanation submitted by She Min,Vice Minister of the Finance Ministry, to the
Fifth National People's Congress, People's Daily, December 9, 1981, p. 4.
wStatement by Yang Shangkun, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fifth
National
People's Congress, People's Daily, Dec. 8, 1981, p. 4.
6
'Supra note 59.
"2Name of Chinese currency often called Ren-Min-Bi (RMBY). One yuan is equivalent to
about U.S. $0.58 at the current rate.
"'CHINA BUSINEss REViEW, Nov.-Dec. 1981 issue, p. 24.
"'Regulations, art. 8.
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on December 18, 1980 to become effective on March 1, 1981.65 According
to this new foreign exchange controls, joint venture and other enterprises
with foreign investment are subject to less stringent rules. All their foreign
exchange receipts must be deposited with, and payments go through Bank
of China. Profits, net of tax, are freely remittable as are all other legitimate
earnings, such as royalty payments or license fees, but remittal of foreign
capital must go through General Administration of Exchange Control
and is subject to an income tax of
(GAEC), as must assets upon liquidation
66
amount.
remitted
the
on
percent
10
3. Technology Trans/er
The urgency for transfer of technology to Chinese personnel during the
exploration and development phase is clearly indicated in the new offshore
petroleum law. 67 Article 12 specifically provides that the foreign contractor
"is obliged to transfer the technology and pass on the experience to the
personnel of the Chinese side." The foreign contractor is also required to
give preference to the Chinese personnel in employment, increase the
employment percentage steadily and train them in a planned way.
Although in the initial stage the foreign contractor will be chiefly responsible for the development and production operations, technology transfer and
participation of Chinese personnel in the operations are made mandatory. 68
This particular emphasis stems from China's basic policy of self-reliance
which the Chinese have and will still pursue in its cooperative venture with
foreign enterprises.
To the American oil companies, the crucial question is to what extent the
Chinese will be allowed to participate in the training and operation of high
technology involved in the offshore exploration and development. That is a
tough issue that will have to be thrashed out during negotiation of the contract. As we know, the exports of American technology to the PRC are
governed by the Export Administration Act of 196969 and the regulations
promulgated by the Office of Export Administration, 70 both of which prohibit the export of technical data and equipment that might be of significance in military use. There are also severe limitations on the training of
Chinese personnel and the number allowed to participate in the operations
related to technology of military significance. However, in recent years
there have been signs of relaxing those restrictions, and that because of
changing political situation in the world arena and prospective Sino-U.S.
strategic alliance.
"5 THE C. LAw., v. 2, no. 3, May 1981, p. 136.
'Income Tax Law concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment, art. 4.
INT'L L. MATS., V. 19, no. 6, Nov. 1980, 1452.
6
Regulations, art. 12, 18 to 21.
"Id. art. 12.
6950 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976).
7015 C.F.R. § 368-99 (1979).
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4. Joint or Cooperative.- A Play of Words?
The Chinese have invented a new term in mineral law, i.e. "cooperative"
instead of "joint" exploitation of petroleum resources as is commonly used.
Since both are not proper legal terms, their subtle difference, if any, can
only be traced to its etymology. The Webster's dictionary defines "joint" as
"united, joined, or sharing with another (as in a right, obligation, status, or
activity)" and "cooperative" as "acting or working with another or others to
a common end" or "associating with another or others for mutual often
economic benefit." 7 ' Thus it is not difficult to see that the word "joint"
connotes sharing in one's right, status, etc., a notion which China rejects on
the ground that China, as a sovereign State, is the sole owner of the petroleum resources in the cooperative venture, and under no circumstances
shall its right of ownership be shared with foreign enterprises. China may.
feel that using the word "cooperative" is less "risky" as it is devoid of the
idea of sharing one's right and is generally limited to economic purpose.
This idea found its full expression in the first article of the Regulations in
which the above idea is implied as can be seen from the following
paragraph:
[T]hese regulations are formulated to permit foreign enterprises to participate
in the cooperative exploitation of offshore petroleum resources of the PRC.
Please note the key words, "permit," "participate," and "cooperative." In
other words, "permission" is necessary before a foreign enterprise can participate. Secondly, it will be in the capacity of a participant, as for example
a participant attending a conference as different from the host of a conference. Thirdly, its participation in the venture is in the "cooperative"
nature.
China has used the term "joint" in the Joint Venture Law. However, that
law is different from the present in that the former does not involve offshore
mineral resources whose ownership is challenged, at least in certain disputed areas, while the latter does.
The right of ownership of natural resources is a sensitive problem, and it
seems that the Chinese leaders have carefully weighed the words they used
in order to avoid possible misinterpretations and undesired implications
that might be detrimental to China's interest.
X. Conclusion
Tlhere have been marked trends since the forties toward direct state participation in natural resources management and control. This state dominance over natural resources can be ascribed to several factors, of which the
most important is the host country's awareness of necessity to exert sovereign rights and control over this critical, strategic material. Petroleum has
"WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, una-

bridged, 1961, at 501 and 1219.
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never assumed such magnitude of importance to a country's existence as it
does today and will continue its domineering role in the world energy structure in the forseeable future unless there is a better energy source to replace
it. The second factor is purely economic and originates in the host country's demand for more revenues from petroleum operations. The oil
producer finds in the oil not only a source of boundless power called "oil
weapon," but also of infinite wealth. Just look at Kuwait, a postage-stamp
size country tucked away in the desert area on the upper reaches of the
Persian Gulf, which has now become the richest country of the world. The
third factor is the national desire to become not only politically but also
economically and technologically independent, though this objective is not
easy to be realized in a short time. In the Chinese terminology it is called
"self-reliance" policy aiming at eventual complete takeover of management
and control by the host country over this critical resource.
The most crucial issue involved in offshore petroleum legislation is how
to strike a reasonable balance between the interests of the host country and
those of the international oil company. As the modern trend is toward
increasing governmental role in the management of offshore oil and gas
resources, the crux of the question has been boiled down to selecting the
most suitable form of government participation. Given China's present
political system and its energy policy as has been discussed in the previous
sections, the most appropriate form of petroleum system to be adopted will
be the joint venture or production sharing formula. Both of them represent
an important step toward equalizing the historical imbalance between the
oil producing countries and the foreign petroleum companies.
The new Chinese offshore petroleum law is basically a framework law
and is substantially based on negotiations. It neither specifies the form of
cooperation which is to exist between the state oil company and the contracting party, nor does it contain essential fiscal provisions. However, as
China's first mineral code aiming to set out general policies and guidelines
governing foreign participation, it, along with the recent Tax Law, has contained essential provisions of attracting and protecting foreign interests in
this dynamic field of offshore petroleum development. The new law is basically in line with the laws of most countries governing joint development of
offshore oil resources. Although there are a couple of provisions which the
foreign investors might not like, such as use of Chinese domestic equipment
and material, they are not mandatory and subject to further negotiations.
Overall, the law has managed to strike a reasonable balance of interests
between China as the host country on the one hand and international oil
companies as contractors on the other. The law has pledged in unequivocal
terms protection of foreign interests in this highly risky cooperative venture.
As we know, the participation of foreign interests in China's cooperative
venture does not simply involve financial risks as such but more importantly, political risks as well. The political climate is so important in a
cooperative venture of this nature that only when political stability and
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peace can be reasonably ascertained in China as well as in the region, could
there be any meaningful, long-term commitment of foreign capital in the
development of petroleum resources in China's offshore seabeds. In this
connection, the limit of China's jurisdiction over its offshore petroleum
resources is a major problem that has yet to be settled among the coastal
handled, might trigger
states in the region, and which, if not appropriately
72
confrontation on a regional scale at any moment.

"For a discussion of this topic, please refer to another article the author has recently written,
which can be obtained upon request.

